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THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 
Roni A. Elias+ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, one of the most important 
developments in American government and politics was the 
expanding power of administrative agencies of all kinds.  Indeed, this 
expansion may have been the most important development.  
Beginning with the Progressive Era and continuing at an accelerated 
pace during the New Deal and after World War II, administrative 
agencies performed a wider variety of government functions and 
imposed more regulations than ever before. 
The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) of 
19461 was the crucial event in the course of this expansion.  The 
APA established both a classification for different types of agency 
decision-making and a set of procedural rules to govern that decision-
making in every respect.  By providing an effective method for 
regulating agency action, the APA preserved individual rights as 
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against the abuse of administrative power and made such action more 
authoritative and acceptable to the public. 
The APA was the culmination of long-term efforts to regulate the 
decision-making of administrative agencies, and it reflected a 
significant political compromise.  This compromise involved two 
groups generally associated with the Republican and Democratic 
parties.  Those oriented toward the Republican side worried that the 
growth of the administrative state posed a threat to individual rights 
and the efficiency of the free market.  Democrats and their allies, 
especially supporters of President Franklin Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, saw advantages in using administrative agencies as instruments 
by which experts could make effective policies that were responsive 
to specific problems and needs in a way that legislation could never 
be.  The ultimate structure of the APA reflects the prime objectives 
of these two groups in important ways, and that reflection is apparent 
in both the text of the statute itself and its legislative history. 
This paper traces the outlines of that reflection.  In Part I, it 
reviews the political background leading up to the proposal of the 
legislation in the 79th Congress that became the APA.  In Part II, it 
reviews the circumstances surrounding how the APA developed and 
was eventually enacted during 1945 and 1946.  Part III discusses the 
evolution of the definitions of the crucial statutory terms that 
categorized agency and culminated in Section 2 of the APA.  Parts 
IV-VI describe how the APA regulated agency rulemaking, agency 
adjudication, and the judicial review of agency action respectively. 
 
I. THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT FOR PROVIDING 
THE UNIFORM REGULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 
Until the twentieth century, the United States had no uniform body 
of administrative law.2   Many Americans resisted the creation of 
formal, uniform administrative law because they believed that such a 
body of law would enhance the ability of government to exercise 
power over citizens and that, regardless of any procedural 
                                            
 2. Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary? The Administrative 
Procedures Act of 1946, 19 REGULATION 40 (1996). 
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protections, it would ultimately diminish individual rights. 3  
Consequently, throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, when Congress delegated authority to an administrative 
agency, any relevant or necessary procedural rules were included in 
the enabling legislation.4 
As administrative agencies increased their authority and power 
during the New Deal, there were still no comprehensive standards for 
governing agency action.  When Congress asked Harry Hopkins, 
head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in the early 
New Deal era, to explain how he made his decisions and to identify 
the criteria he used to allocate funds, he simply declined to answer.5  
Given the well-established skepticism about administrative agencies, 
such a response only enhanced doubts about the expansion of the 
administrative state.6  This was particularly true among Republican 
opponents of the Roosevelt administration.  They were already 
troubled about the substantive objectives given to agencies by New 
Deal legislation; any suggestion of procedural high-handedness in the 
pursuit of those objectives only intensified those concerns.7 
Lacking a Congressional majority and control of the White House, 
Republicans relied on the judiciary to prevent the implementation of 
New Deal programs and the grant of extensive authority to agencies.  
During the first two years of President Roosevelt’s first term, courts 
issued more than 1,600 injunctions against the enforcement of New 
Deal legislation.8  But after the Supreme Court’s decision in West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,9 which turned the tide on judicial resistance 
to the New Deal, Roosevelt’s Republican opponents proposed 
legislation designed to limit the power of regulatory agencies by 
imposing a series of strong procedural and judicial constraints on 
their actions, including strict limits on agencies’ discretion to make 
policy and change existing law.10 
                                            
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. John Joseph Wallis, The Political Economy of New Deal Federalism, 
29 ECON. INQUIRY 510 (1991). 
 6. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 196 (1999). 
 7. Id. at 199. 
 8. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 55 (1962). 
 9. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 10. McCubbins et al., supra note 6, at 190. 
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One instrument for advancing these legislative proposals was the 
Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”), which was established in 1933 and led by 
Roscoe Pound. The Special Committee’s concluded that New Deal 
agencies were acting without considered judgment, without due 
process, without sufficient consideration of the issues, and without 
granting parties the right to be heard or procedures for relief.11  In 
addition, the Special Committee was concerned that agencies were 
improperly blending modes of procedure that should be distinct, 
namely rulemaking, factual investigation, and adjudication.12 
In 1938, the Special Committee drafted “An Act to Provide for a 
More Expeditious Settlement of Disputes with the United States,” 
later known as the Walter–Logan bill.13  The focus of this bill was the 
creation of a new United States Court of Appeals for Administration 
“to receive, decide, and expedite appeals from federal commissions, 
administrative authorities, and tribunals in which the United States is 
a party or has an interest, and for other purposes.”14  This appellate 
court would have the authority to evaluate agency rulings and grant 
relief for individuals and firms affected by agency decisions.15 Given 
the backing of the ABA and prominent scholars such as Pound, the 
Walter-Logan bill won majorities in both houses of Congress, but 
President Roosevelt vetoed it.16 
Recognizing the political momentum in favor of some procedural 
reform for administrative action, the Roosevelt administration 
undertook its own efforts at drafting legislation imposing procedural 
rules.  In 1939, as the Walter–Logan bill was making its way through 
Congress, President Roosevelt set up a committee led by the 
Attorney General to investigate the need for procedural reform.17 
Roosevelt hoped that the committee would recommend moderate 
reforms and isolate those in Congress who wanted more radical 
                                            
 11. Id. at 196. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 195-96. 
 14. American Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on 
Administrative Law, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT 
(1938). 
 15. McCubbins et al., supra note 6, at 195-96. 
 16. Id. at 196. 
 17. Id. at 195-96. 
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reforms of administrative procedure.18  Early in 1941, the Attorney 
General’s committee submitted its report.19 It provided an overview 
of the administrative process as it then existed, a set of 
recommendations, and monographs on twenty-seven different 
agencies. 
The report made three principal recommendations: (1) the creation 
of a new office with power to appoint and remove hearing 
commissioners; (2) the publication of agency rules, policies and 
interpretations, including the dates at which agency rules went into 
effect; and (3) the appointment of special hearing officers in 
adjudicatory proceedings.20 But the impulse to reform administrative 
procedure was thwarted by two important factors.  First, the 
continued popularity of President Roosevelt and his programs 
diminished Democratic support for alternatives to Walter-Logan.  
Congressional Democrats might have been willing to vote for 
administrative procedure reform, but they would not press for it.21  
Second, and even more importantly, as the U.S. responded to the 
looming threat of World War II and to the war itself, reforms that 
would have made administrative action slower and more easily 
challenged seemed less appealing.  The wartime need for quick and 
decisive government action in all areas made it seem an inopportune 
moment for restricting agency autonomy.22 
 
 
II. THE PROPOSAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 
By 1946, many of the factors that had inhibited progress towards 
the reform of administrative procedure had weakened or disappeared 
entirely. The shooting war in Europe and Asia was over – although 
                                            
 18. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative 
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557. 
1594-98 (1996). 
 19. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941). See Shepherd, supra note 18, at 
1632-38. 
 20. McCubbins et al., supra note 6, at 197. 
 21. See id. 
22. See id. 
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the Cold War was just beginning.  President Roosevelt had died and 
his replacement, Harry Truman, lacked his predecessor’s political 
persuasiveness and power.23 Democrats had lost their commanding 
majorities in the House and Senate.24 
Given all of these significant changes, Democrats had newfound 
motives for wanting to reform administrative procedure, especially if 
those reforms made it harder for agencies to depart from the status 
quo.25  They worried that they might lose control of Congress in the 
mid-term elections of 1946 as well as the White House in the 
presidential election two years later. If these worries were realized, 
they anticipated that the ascendancy of the Republican Party could 
lead to the elimination or constriction of many New Deal programs.26 
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the war, Congressional 
Democrats began to consider how to preserve the New Deal without 
control of both the White House and Congress.27  This consideration 
led Democrats to support procedural restraints on agency action for 
two principal reasons.28  First, Democrats recognized that the absence 
of formal procedural requirements for agency action would give a 
Republican president exceptional discretion to direct agency 
decision-making in whatever way he might choose.29  Legislation 
that mandated a fairly rigorous system of procedural safeguards for 
administrative action would create a significant amount of inertia 
favoring the status quo established during the New Deal era.30  As 
one commentator has noted, “with the procedural restraints in place, 
the Republicans could only repeal New Deal regulatory policies if 
they gained control of both houses of Congress and the 
presidency.”31 
Second, Democrats began to appreciate that strengthening judicial 
review of agency action would favor the preservation of the New 
Deal status quo.  In the wake of a sixteen-year Democratic 
                                            
23. See generally BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC:  A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 773 (3d ed. 1985). 
24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 190-91. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 192. 
 29. McCubbins et al., supra note 6, at 192. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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administration, the judiciary was filled with Roosevelt appointees 
who were friendly to New Deal programs. 32   A reform of 
administrative procedure that enhanced the judicial review of agency 
action would tend to favor Democratic political objectives – the 
inverse of the situation that prevailed for most of the 1930s, when 
empowering judges to review agency action meant giving 
Republican-appointees power over Democratic programs.33 
Republicans retained their own reasons for wanting administrative 
procedure reform, even if such reform provided some advantages to 
Democrats in the preservation of New Deal policies.  For one thing, 
Republicans concluded that promoting judicial review of agency 
action would not simply lead to a result in which Democratic judicial 
appointees ratified New Deal policies. 34   Regardless of who 
appointed the judges, judicial review would make it harder for 
agencies to set new directions in policy and to act on the basis of 
unconstrained discretion.35  Thus, Republicans saw advantages for 
their party’s constituencies, even if Republican appointees no longer 
controlled the judiciary.36  In addition, Republicans concluded that 
they would not lose their ability to enact legislation to undo the New 
Deal just because they also enacted legislation that putting judicial 
constraints on the scope of agency discretion. 37   In other words, 
Republicans concluded that, if they could win both the White House 
and Congress, they could accomplish their political ends even more 
effectively than if they tried to do so by controlling agency 
appointments and relying upon the exercise of untrammelled agency 
discretion. 
Second, if the Republicans did gain control of the office of the 
president, they were also likely to gain control of Congress. In fact, 
they briefly did control both the House and the Senate twice after 
1946: 1947–1948, and 1953–1954. In either period, had a Republican 
who was antagonistic to the New Deal been president rather than 
Harry Truman in the earlier period or Dwight Eisenhower in the later 
one, Republicans could have undone the New Deal by statutory 
                                            
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 194. 
 35. McCubbins et al., supra note 6, at 194. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 194-95. 
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repeal. Voting for the APA did not preclude voting for more 
substantial changes later on.38 
Congress passed the APA in early 1946, with the Senate approving 
in February, and the House in May.39  President Truman signed the 
bill into law in June. 40   In general, the legislation created three 
principal categories of administrative action: (1) rulemaking, in 
which agencies imposed regulations; (2) adjudication, in which 
agencies resolved disputes by finding facts and making conclusions 
of law; and (3) discretionary agency decision-making.41  The APA 
imposed specific procedural regimes for rulemaking and 
adjudication, and it did not require any particular kind of formal 
procedure for actions conferred to agency discretion.42 
 
III. DEFINING THE CATEGORIES OF AGENCY ACTION 
Like many statutes, the APA begins with a section defining its 
essential terms.43  This definitional section of the APA is important 
not only because it specifies the meaning of important term, but also 
because it establishes a foundational – and novel – categorization of 
types of agency action.  This categorization is the basis upon which 
the APA establishes its procedural requisites.  In this respect, it 
reflects both a legal conception of how agencies work and a political 
conception of the extent to which agency procedures should protect 
the status quo and permit official discretion. 
The legislative history reveals that these foundational definitions 
were the subject of extensive revision throughout the legislative 
process.  Congress’ definition of the fundamental categories of 
agency action changed substantially while various drafts of the APA 
were pending before the House and the Senate.  This change involved 
differing views of how to draw lines between different kinds of 
agency action.  In particular, this change led to a distinction between 
“forward looking” agency decisions of general applicability, which 
                                            
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 197-98. 
 40. Id. 
 41. P.L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946); see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS 
THE GUARDIANS? 45 (1988) (discussing the APA). 
 42. SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 45. 
 43. Section 2, P.L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
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are designed to regulate future conduct, and “backward looking” 
decisions, which apply to the specific circumstances of particular 
parties and are designed to resolve disputes about past events.  This 
distinction proved to be a crucial factor in determining the structure 
of administrative procedure under the APA. 
In the original version of the APA, which was introduced into the 
Senate in January 1945, “rule” was defined in the following way: 
“Rule” means the whole or any part of any agency statement of 
general applicability designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe 
law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of any agency. “Rule making” means agency process 
for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule and includes the 
approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or 
financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, 
appliances, services, or allowances therefor, or of valuations, costs, 
or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing.44 
Thus, the original Senate proposal expressly defined “rule” as an 
“agency statement of general applicability.” 45   In addition, it 
provided an implied definition of “rule” through the definition of 
“rule making,” which related to the “approval or prescription for the 
future” of rates, wages, and the like.46 
By contrast, that same bill seemed to define the adjudicative 
process as anything that was not rulemaking.  The original Senate bill 
defined “order” as “the whole or any part of the final disposition or 
judgment (whether or not affirmative, negative, or declaratory in 
form) of any agency” and “adjudication” as agency “process, in a 
particular instance other than rule making but including licensing.”47 
In the revised text of the Comparative Committee Print, however, 
the definition of “rule making” was changed to “agency process for 
the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule and includes rate 
making or wage or price fixing.”48   The change was explained this 
way: 
                                            
 44. SEN. REP. No. 752, pp. 11, 39 (1945), in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS, 1944-46, SEN. DOC. No. 248, pp. 197, 225 
(hereinafter “APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. S. REP. No. 752, p. 218 (1945). 
 48. Robert W. Ginnane, “Rule Making,” “Adjudication” and Exemptions 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. PENN. L. REV. 621, 624-27 (1947). 
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The House Judiciary Committee hearings and some of the agency 
comments disclose a misunderstanding that “rule making” includes 
rate making or price or wage fixing, although both on principle under 
the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, and by the specific 
language of subsection 2(c) such functions are definitely rule making.  
The classification of these functions as rule making, which they 
properly are, is important because many provisions of the bill do not 
apply to rule making.   If deemed necessary the language of the 
definition may be amplified by adding, after the word “include” in 
the second sentence, the words “the prescription for the future of 
rates, wages, prices, facilities, appliances, services, allowances 
therefor, or of valuations, costs, accounting, or practices bearing 
thereon.49 
Thus, the final version of the APA substantially expanded the 
definition of the concept of “rule” and correspondingly narrowed the 
definition of the concept of “adjudication.”  As one commentator has 
noted, this change was apparently designed to meet agency insistence 
that flexible procedures must be provided for cases characterized by 
the shaping of broad policies upon the basis of masses of technical 
data—cases in which it would be idle to expect an effective 
determination from a single hearing officer as required for 
adjudication procedures.50 
Thus, after the combined efforts of the House and Senate, the 
definition of “rule” reflected some confusion.  After starting with the 
concept of agency action of general applicability, it had been 
enlarged to include agency action of particular applicability and 
future effect with respect to important classes of matters.  This 
definition apparently conflicted with the concepts of  “order” and 
“adjudication” as set forth in the original Senate bill. 
As the Senate bill was reported by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary in May 1946, the definitions of “rule” and “order” were in 
their final form, with the concept of “future effect” being particularly 
important.51 Thus, “rule” was defined as “any agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and future effect.”  The House 
Committee report explains that this “change of the language to 
                                            
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 626 (citing Testimony of I. C. C. Commissioner Aitchison before 
House Judiciary Subcommittee, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 235-36, pp. 91 et 
seq.). 
 51. H.R. Rep. No. 1980, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 235-36. 
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embrace specifically rules of ‘particular’ as well as ‘general’ 
applicability is necessary in order to avoid controversy and assure 
coverage of rule making addressed to named persons. The Senate 
Committee report so interprets the provision, and the other changes 
are likewise in conformity with the Senate Committee report (p. ii).” 
52  Correspondingly, the definition of “order” was changed to include 
the word, “injunctive.”53  The House Committee report explained that 
this addition is prompted by the fact that some people interpret 
“future effect” as used in defining rule making, to include injunctive 
action, whereas the latter is traditionally and clearly adjudication. It is 
made even more necessary that this matter be clarified because of the 
amendment of Section 2(c) to embrace clearly particularized rule 
making as set forth in note 1.54 
The ultimate effect of all of these changes is to make the 
distinction between “rulemaking” and “adjudication” turn on the 
chronological orientation of agency action.  A “rule” is agency action 
that has “future effect” or an “approval or prescription for the 
future.” 55   This approach to defining “rulemaking” discarded the 
conventional approach that preceded the APA, discarding the 
emphasis on the creation of standards of “general applicability” as 
being a crucial aspect of rulemaking.56   As an additional part of 
establishing this chronological orientation, the term “injunctive” was 
added to the definition of both “order” and “adjudication” “to assure 
that such matters as orders to cease and desist from unfair methods of 
competition and unfair labor practices would be classified as 
adjudication.”57  As the House Judiciary Committee Report put it: 
                                            
 52. Id. at 283. 
 53. Id. at 284. 
 54. Id. at 284; see also id. at 254 (“‘Injunctive’ action is a common 
determination of past or existing lawfulness, although the remedy or sanction is in 
form cast as a command or restriction for the future rather than as a fine, 
assessment of damages or other present penalty.”). 
 55. Ginnane, supra note 48, at 626. 
 56. See 1944 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, p. 329 (outlining the Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act, which distinguished between “rule” and “contested case” by 
defining “rule” “every regulation, standard, or statement of policy or interpretation 
of general application and future effect.”); see also Ginnane, supra note 48, at 626-
27. 
 57. Ginnane, supra note 48, at 626-27. 
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“Rules” formally prescribe a course of conduct for the future rather 
than pronounce past or existing rights or liabilities. . . . The term 
“order” is essentially and necessarily defined to exclude rules. 
“Licensing” is specifically included to remove any question, since 
licenses involve a pronouncement of present rights of named parties 
although they may also prescribe terms and conditions for future 
observance.58 
The legislative history shows that this understanding was broadly 
held.  For example, in explaining the Administrative Procedure Bill 
to the House, Representative Walter distinguished rule making from 
adjudication by pointing out: 
First, there are the legislative functions of administrative agencies, 
where they issue general or particular regulations which in form or 
effect are like the statutes of the Congress. . . .  The second kind of 
administrative operation is found in those familiar situations in which 
an officer or agency determines the particular case just as, in other 
fields of law, the courts determine cases.59 
Similarly, in a memorandum to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Attorney General Clark explained: 
Proceedings are classed as rule making under this act not 
merely because, like the legislative process, they result in 
regulations of general applicability but also be- cause they 
involve subject matter demanding judgments based on 
technical knowledge and experience. . . . In many instances 
of adjudication, on the other hand, the accusatory element 
is strong, and individual compliance or behavior is 
challenged; in such cases, special procedural safeguards 
should be provided to insure fair judgments on the facts as 
they may properly appear of record.60 
Interestingly, this substantial reconfiguration of the foundational 
concepts in the statute did not entail a corresponding reconfiguration 
of the sections prescribing the procedures for various agency 
functions, Sections 4, 5, 7 & 8 of the APA.  This suggests that, from 
                                            
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 254. 
 59. 79 CONG. REC. 5754 (May 24, 1946), in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 352-
53. 
 60. S. REP. NO. 752, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 225. 
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Congress’ perspective, the decisive part of the draft bills was the 
operational procedures for agency action and that the definition of the 
categories for agency action was adapted to fit the operational 
procedures.61 
 
IV. RULEMAKING PROCEDURE 
As a general rule, the APA requires that, when an agency 
promulgates legislative rules, or rules made pursuant to 
congressionally delegated authority, the exercise of that authority is 
governed by the informal rulemaking procedures outlined in Section 
4. 62    In an effort to ensure public participation in the informal 
rulemaking process, agencies are required to provide the public with 
adequate notice of a proposed rule followed by a meaningful 
opportunity to comment on the rule’s content.63  Although the APA 
sets the minimum degree of public participation the agency must 
permit, Congress emphasized that this procedure was only a 
minimum requirement and that “[matters] of great importance, or 
those where the public submission of facts will be either useful to the 
agency or a protection to the public, should naturally be accorded 
more elaborate public procedures.”64 
To assure this degree of public participation in rulemaking, the 
APA requires that the notice of proposed rulemaking include “(1) a 
statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking 
proceedings; (2) reference to the authority under which the rule is 
proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule 
or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”65 Once adequate 
notice is provided, the agency must provide interested persons with a 
meaningful opportunity to comment on the proposed rule through the 
submission of written “data, views, or arguments.” 66   Once the 
comment period has closed, the APA directs the agency to consider 
the “relevant matter presented” and incorporate into the adopted rule 
a “concise general statement” of the “basis and purpose” of the final 
                                            
 61. Ginnane, supra note 48, at 627. 
 62. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 4 (1946). 
 63. Id. 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 259. 
 65. Pub. L. NO. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 4(a) (1946). 
 66. Id. § 4(c). 
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rule.67  Although the statutory text does not elaborate on what kind of 
statement should be included, the legislative history materials show 
that the general statement of basis and purpose should “enable the 
public to obtain a general idea of the purpose of, and a statement of 
the basic justification for, the rules.”68 
The APA also provided for a more elaborate procedure for certain 
kinds of rulemaking.  The APA provides that “when rules are 
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing” the formal rulemaking requirements of § 7 and § 8 
of the APA apply.69  Under this mode of procedure, the agency must 
undertake rulemaking by engaging in trial-like procedures, which 
include the presence of a neutral hearing officer,70 the opportunity for 
parties to present evidence and conduct cross-examination of 
contrary evidence,71 and the agency’s ultimate determinations must 
be made on the basis of the entire record and must include reasoned 
explanations in terms of that record.72 
 
V. ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE 
The APA’s provisions governing adjudication created little in the 
way of novel procedures.  Their principal effect was to require that 
agencies make adjudicative decisions according to basic elements of 
well-established judicial procedure. 73  Accordingly, it required an 
internal separation of functions between adjudicators and 
adversaries.74  The APA also required the establishment of a record 
as the basis for any adjudicative decision, and this record would be 
developed by permitting parties with adverse interests to submit 
evidence and have an opportunity to rebut their opponents’ evidence 
through cross-examination and similar procedures.75  Finally, when 
                                            
 67. Id. 
 68. S. REP. NO. 752, in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 225. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 4(b) (1946) (referring to §§ 7 & 8 of the 
APA). 
 70. Id. § 7(a). 
 71. Id. § 7(b). 
 72. Id. § 8. 
 73. See id. §§ 7 & 8. 
 74. Id. § 7(a). 
 75. P.L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 7(c)-(d) (1946). 
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the hearing officer made a final decision, it had to include substantial 
reasons based on the evidence in the record.76 
 
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
As the history of the political forces behind the APA indicates, the 
provision for substantial judicial review of agency action was a 
crucial part of the statutory scheme.  Thus, Section 10 of the APA 
provided that “any person suffering legal wrong because of an 
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action 
within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial 
review thereof.”77  There are only two exceptions to the availability 
of judicial review of agency action.  Judicial review is not available 
(1) “to the extent that ... statutes preclude judicial review” and (2) 
“where agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”78 
When courts do review agency action under the APA, they can 
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions” on the basis of the entire administrative record when 
such conclusions are found to be: 
(1)  arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; 
(2)  contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
  
(3)  in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right; 
(4)  without observance of procedure required by law; 
(5)  unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(6)  unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject 
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.79 
This description of the standards for judicial review indicates that 
the level of judicial scrutiny may vary, depending on whether the 
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court is reviewing formal or informal rulemakings—respectively 
“substantial evidence” or “arbitrary and capricious.”80 
The provisions for judicial review under the APA were not meant 
to exclude previously established rules for judicial review of agency 
action.  The legislative history shows that Congress intended the 
APA’s form of judicial review to supplement, not replace, those 
established forms.  The Senate subcommittee report was unequivocal 
in asserting that the APA’s methods of review are “of two kinds: (a) 
those contained in statutes and (b) those developed by the courts in 
absence of legislation.”81  Thus, the APA did not preclude the use of 
habeas corpus proceedings to obtain review of agency action in 
exclusion and deportation proceedings.82 
By calling for judicial review on the basis of the entire agency 
record, the APA also did not intend to establish a greater level of 
judicial scrutiny for agency action than was already established.  
During subcommittee testimony in 1941 regarding an earlier version 
of the APA, which was based on the findings of the minority report 
of the Attorney General’s Committee, several witnesses and several 
of the members of the Senate subcommittee before whom the 
hearings were being conducted had expressed doubt as to the exact 
meaning and purpose of the requirement that review be “on the 
whole record.”83  Responsive testimony made it unequivocally clear 
that the purpose of the phrase was not “to broaden the review powers 
of the court. . . to any extent.”84  When that same statutory language 
came up in connection with the APA four years later, the phrase was 
altered in a memorandum submitted to Congress by the minority of 
the Attorney General’s Committee so that it read almost exactly like 
the language in the Act as finally passed.85 
This point was reiterated in the Congressional Debate.  Carl Mc 
Farland, testifying at the 1945 hearings, reiterated the assurances that 
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the Act did not alter the substantial evidence rule and “reflected” the 
then-established judicial rule for judicial review of agency action.86  
Senator Morse87 and Representative Walter88 endorsed these views 
on the floor of their respective houses, and the Attorney General 
assured the Senate that the APA’s judicial review provisions were 
“intended to embody the law as declared . . . "89 
The APA’s judicial review provisions also inspired some concern 
that they would make it possible for the courts to engage in a 
“premature” review that would imperil agencies’ discretion and 
authority to complete the process of their decision-making.90  But the 
drafters of the APA made it clear that the right to judicial review 
would only materialize when the party alleging a grievance had 
suffered an actual injury to an established legal right. This assurance 
is reflected by the requirement explicit in Section 10(a) that a 
petitioner must show a “legal interest” which is being immediately 
jeopardized by the challenged agency action.91 
 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the administrative state during the twentieth 
century has been one of the most controversial aspects of American 
political history.  That controversy has circled principally around two 
competing contentions: (1) whether the delegation of government 
power, especially regulatory power, to unelected officials impairs 
individual freedom and threatens the efficiency of the free market; 
and (2) whether the complexities of modern society and economic 
life can only be effectively managed by experts who reside in 
government agencies, who are insulated from the dynamics of 
partisan politics, and who have extensive discretion to make policy 
and rules and to resolve disputes. 
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The Administrative Procedure Act is an attempt to come to grips 
with both of those contentions.  Through its establishment of a 
notice-and-comment procedure for rulemaking, through its 
requirement of trial-like procedures for agency adjudication, and, 
above all, through its provision of judicial review for the 
overwhelming majority of agency decisions, the APA creates a 
foundation for protecting the rights of individuals and enterprises 
against the abuse of power by unelected officials.  Through its 
acceptance of a high degree of discretionary authority by agencies, 
the APA also accommodates the need to let agencies employ their 
expertise with efficiency and dispatch. 
The APA manages to serve both of these competing political 
interests by framing the nature and requisites of agency action within 
a structure that is consistent with the fundamental principles of 
constitutional due process.  To the extent that agencies act like 
legislatures, making forward-looking rules to bind individual 
conduct, they are held to the kinds of procedural standards within 
which legislatures must operate.  To the extent that agencies act like 
courts, deciding factual issues and imposing orders as a means of 
resolving disputes arising from past events, agencies are held to 
procedural standards characteristic of the courts.  Overall, the APA 
makes the administrative state safe for American democracy. 
